Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. v.
Scott G. Campbell, Claudia Campbell : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Charles W. Hanna; Smith & Hanna; Attorney for Appellant.
W. Jerry Ungricht; Nieder & Ward; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Scott G. Campbell, Claudia Campbell, No. 910419.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3672

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah
corporation,

]1

Plaintiff/Appellant,

;)

v.

Case No. 900301

]
District Court
Civil No. 45208

]
)

SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and
CLAUDIA CAMPBELL,

Classification No.

Defendants/Respondents.
ON APPEAL FROM THE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)355-5656
Attorney for Appellant
W. Jerry Ungricht
NIEDER & WARD
7050 S. Union Park Ave., #420
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801)566-3688
Attorney for Respondent

w* c i 1990
Clerk, Supreme Cm^i^u'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah
corporation,

]1

Plaintiff/Appellant,

])

v.

Case No. 900301

]
District Court
Civil No. 45208

]
)

SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and
CLAUDIA CAMPBELL,

Classification No.

Defendants/Respondents.
ON APPEAL FROM THE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)355-5656
Attorney for Appellant
W. Jerry Ungricht
NIEDER & WARD
7050 S. Union Park Ave., #420
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801)566-3688
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
i:L

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings

2

C.

Disposition at Trial Court

3

D.

Relevant Facts

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT:
I.
THE EXECUTION OF A LIEN WAIVER DOES NOT ABROGATE A
BUILDER'S RIGHT TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT BASED UPON THE FAILURE OF THE OWNER TO PAY ALL
OF THE SUMS DUE AND OWING UNDER THE TERMS OF A
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

9

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
EFFECT OF THE MUTUAL MISTAKE ON THE CONTRACT FORMED BY
THE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF CLOSING

12

III. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A LIEN WAIVER ON THE
BACK OF A CHECK MADE PAYABLE TO NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. WAS EFFECTIVE IN WAIVING
NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.fS RIGHT TO
A MECHANIC'S LIEN WHERE THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN
THE PARTIES WAS THAT PROGRESS PAYMENTS WERE ISSUED WITH
A LIEN WAIVER ON THE BACK OF EACH CHECK AND THE INTENT
OF THE PARTIES WAS THAT THE LIEN RELEASE ONLY
DISCHARGED THE LIEN RIGHTS AS TO THE MATERIALS AND
LABOR FOR WHICH PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THAT PARTICULAR
CHECK

15

IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFF, NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
ON ITS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER
THE BONDING STATUTE AND QUANTUM MERUIT WHERE THOSE
ISSUES WERE NOT BRIEFED NOR ARGUED BEFORE THE COURT. . . .19
-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated §14-2-1, et seq

20

CASES:
Brimwood Homes Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Company,
385 P.2d 982 (Utah 1963)

16, 17

Campbell v. Schwers-Campbell, Inc.,
245 P.2d 497 (M.M. 1955)

19

Crewse v. Munroe,
355 P.2d 637 (Or. 1960)

19

Evans v. Evans,
314 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1957)

19

Gibson v. Koutsky-Brennan-Vana Co.,
9 N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 1942)

11

Guardian State Bank v. Stangl,
778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989)

14

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v. Professional
Travel Association, 592 P.2d 586 (Utah 1979)

United World
11

In re: Haydenys Estate,
254 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1953)

19

Jephson v. Ambuel,
473 P.2d 932 (Id. 1970)

19

Oldenburg v. Sears Roebuck and Company,
314 P.2d 33 (Cal. App. 1957)

19

Pierce v. Pepper,
405 P.2d 345 (Utah 1965)

12, 20

Portland Electric and Plumbing Company v. Simpson,
651 P.2d 172 (Ore. App. 1982)

17

Ragsdale Brothers Roofing Inc. v. United Bank of Denver, N.A.,
744 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1987)
17
Robert Langston Ltd. v. McQuarrie,
741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987)
-ii-

13

Sisler v. Whitten,
393 P.2d 497 (Ok. 1964)

19

Tanner v. District Court Judges,
469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982)

13

Tarrant v. Monson,
619 P.2d 1210 (Nev. 1980)

13

EXHIBITS:

23

Exhibit "A"
Order, Judgment and Decree of the Court dated July 16, 1990
Exhibit "B"
Ruling on Objections to Judgment
Exhibit "C"
The Court ' s Memorandum Decision
Exhibit "D"
March 19, 1990 letter requesting clarification of the judgment

-lii-

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Rule 3 of
the Rules of The Utah Supreme Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby of the Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, State of Utah, in Civil No. 45208.

The Amended

Order, Judgment and Decree was entered on the 16th day of July,
1990.

The Amended Notice of Appeal in the instant case was filed

on the 20th of July, 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does

the

signing

of

a lien waiver

abrogate

a

builderfs right to a cause of action for breach of contract based
upon the failure of the owner to pay all of the sums due and
owing under the terms of a construction contract?
2.

Did the Court fail to properly take into account

the effect of the mutual mistake on the contract formed by the
parties at the time of closing?
3.

Did the Court correctly rule that a lien waiver on

the back of a check made payable to Niederhauser Builders and
Development Corp. was effective in waiving Niederhauser Builders
and Development

Corp.fs right to a mechanic's

lien where the

course dealing between the parties was that progress payments
were issued with a lien waiver on the back of each check, but the
-1-

intention

of

the

parties

was

that

the

lien

release

only

discharged the lien rights only as to the materials and labor for
which payment was made by that particular check.
4.

Did

the Court

err

in granting

summary

judgment

against Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. on its causes
of action for personal liability under the bonding statute and
quantum meruit where those issues were not briefed nor argued
before the Court?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff brought a claim for breach of contract, lien

foreclosure, personal

liability under the bonding

statute and

quantum meruit after a bank error at the closing resulted in the
plaintiff being paid $5,319.62 less than the amount plaintiff was
entitled to under the terms of the construction contract.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On April 3, 1989, plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and

Development Corp., filed its complaint against defendants, SCOTT
G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL.
counterclaim on April 26, 1990.

Defendants filed an answer and

After conducting some discovery,

both plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary judgment.
An Order, Judgment and Decree denying the plaintifffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and granting the defendantsf Motion for Summary
Judgment

was

filed

on October

27, 1989.

An Amended

Order,

Judgment and Decree, which had the effect of a final order from
-2-

which an appeal could be taken pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was filed on June 18, 1990.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
On September 12, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby

presiding for the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
State of Utah, denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the
plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice and declaring void and of no
effect the plaintiff's lien upon the defendants' real property.
A copy of the Amended Order, Judgment and Decree is attached as
Exhibit "A".
D.

RELEVANT FACTS.
1.

CLAUDIA

On July 12, 1988, defendants, SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and

CAMPBELL,

signed

a Standard

Form

Agreement

Between

Contractor And Owner pursuant to the terms of which Niederhauser
Builders and Development Corp. agreed to build a home for the
Campbells.

The price

stated

in the standard

between contract and owner was to be $87,700.00.

form

agreement

The contract

further provided for change orders for all work not included in
the contract (Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, R. 89).
2.

The Campbells home was built in an area where the

residential covenant required the home to be built larger than
the plans and specifications.
increased.
increased

A

The size of the home had to be

statement was added

size of the home

to the contract

as required

-3-

by the

that the

architectural

committee would be treated as an extra and settled at the time of
closing (R. 24).
3.
payments

During

were

Development

made

Corp.

the
to

course

of

plaintiff,

Each check

construction,

Niederhauser

contained

progress

Builders

and

a lien waiver which

released all lien rights of the endorser up to the date of the
check (Affidavit of Scott Campbell, R. 77).
During the course of construction on the Campbells1

4.

home, there were changes and extras requested by the Campbells
which totalled
allowances

by

$7,727.19, and the Campbells over-spent

their

$4,786.00, which brought the total contract to

$100,214.00 (Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, R. 90, 169).
5.
And

Owner

The Standard Form Of Agreement Between Contractor

made

defendants,

CAMPBELLS,

responsible

for

any

construction loan costs, service charges, interest, points, etc.,
which were

to be paid

at the time of closing

(copy of the

Standard Form Of Agreement Between Contractor And Owner, R. 95).
6.

The

total

of

the

loan

costs, service

interest and reconveyance fee totaled $5,080.91.
fact

paid

by

Niederhauser

Builders

and

charges,

This sum was in

Development

Corp.

(Affidavit of Bryan Marston, R. 87).
7.

The cost of the lot purchased by the Campbells was

$25,000.00 (Ruling on Motions, R. 154).
8.

The total cost of the Campbell home at the closing

should have been:

-4-

$87,700.00
$7,727.19
$4,786.00
$5,080.91

Basic contract price
Extras requested by Campbells
Campbells overspend allowance
Loan fees, interest, etc. on
construction loan
Lot price

$25,000.00
$130,294.10
9.

The

Total

total

price

for

the

Campbells'

home

was

mistakenly calculated at the closing to be $125,214.00 (Ruling on
Motions, R. 154).
10.
received

Niederhauser

a total

of

Builders

$84,370.43

and

from

Development

Corp.

the construction

loan.

Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. received $10,204.24
at the time of closing.
Corp.

received

$49.91

Niederhauser Builders and Development
as a refund

for interest paid on the

construction loan and $300.00 from an escrow established at the
time

of

closing.

The

total

amount

of

money

received

by

Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for the construction
of

the

Campbell

home

Niederhauser, paragraph

was

$94,924.58

6, R.

91).

(Affidavit

of

Bruce

As defendants, SCOTT G.

CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL, had agreed to pay $100,244.20 to
Niederhauser

Builders

and

Development

Corp. at the

time of

closing, and Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. had only
received $94,924.58, Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp.
had

an outstanding

balance due and owing to it of

$5,319.62

(Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 7, R. 91).
11.

On December 28, 1988, Lynn Niederhauser submitted

a draw on the construction loan in the amount of $14,007.80.

At

that time, First Security Bank determined that the total amount
-5-

of the draw exceeded the amount left in the construction loan,
whereupon

First Security Bank of Utah designated

a number of

checks which totaled $5,639.33 to be paid at the closing of the
Campbells1 property (Affidavit of Bryan Marston, paragraph 5, R.
85).
12.

Employees of the Layton Branch of First Security

Bank of Utah informed Greg Eborn of the Bountiful Branch of First
Security

Bank

of

Utah

on

a number

of

occasions

that

the

construction loan payoff needed to be the amount of $109,644.96,
and that in addition to that amount, checks needed to be drawn at
the

closing

in the

amount

of

$5,639.33

to pay

the

various

laborers and suppliers who had provided labor and materials on
the

Campbells 1

property.

A

copy

of

a draw

sheet

showing

specifically those individuals who needed to be paid from the
$5,639.33 amount was faxed by the Layton Branch of First Security
Bank to Greg Eborn at the Bountiful Branch of First Security Bank
(Affidavit of Bryan Marston, paragraph 6, R. 85-86).
13.
Campbells*

A

mistake

property

and

occurred
First

at

the

Security

closing

Bank

of

received

the
from

Associated Title a check in the amount of $109,644.96 to pay off
the

construction

loan.

However, First Security Bank

did not

receive any checks to pay the laborers and materialmen, which
should

have

totaled

$5,639.33

(Affidavit

of

Bryan

Marston,

paragraph 8, R. 86).
14.
provided

Bruce Niederhauser prepared a document which was

to the title

company

at the time of closing, which

-6-

document showed the original contract price of $87,700.00 and
allowance and extras in the amount of $12,514.00, which was added
to produce a new contract price of $100,214.00 (this price did
not

include

represented

loan
the

fees,

or

the

cost

of

the

amount owed to Niederhauser

lot.

It

only

Builders).

The

document prepared by Bruce Niederhauser is attached as Exhibit
"C"

to his Supplemental

Affidavit

(Supplemental

Affidavit of

Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 7, R. 169).
15.
sum

of

From the total of $100,214.00 was subtracted the

$90,009.76,

submitted

which

to Layton Hills

balance of $10,204.24.

represented
First

draws

that

Security Mortgage

had

been

leaving a

This amount of $10,204.24 was used by the

title company as the payoff figure due to Niederhauser Builders
and Development Corp. as shown by Exhibit "D" to the Supplemental
Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser (Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce
Niederhauser, paragraph 8, R. 169-170).
16.

At the time of the closing, Niederhauser Builders

and Development Corp. had submitted draws to the Layton Branch of
First

Security

Builders

and

Bank

which totaled

Development

$90,009.76.

Corp. was

unaware

Niederhauser

that

the

draws

exceeded the loan amount and the total of these draws was never
paid to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp..

The total

amount paid to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. from
the

construction

loan only

totaled

$84,370.43

(Supplemental

Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 9, R. 170).

-7-

17.

At the closing, when Niederhauser

Builders and

Development Corp. accepted a check for $10,204.24, the last draw
from the construction

loan had not been paid and Niederhauser

Builders and Development Corp. was not aware that because of the
fact that the draw request exceeded the loan amount, the entire
draw

would

not

be

paid

(Supplemental

Affidavit

of

Bruce

Niederhauser, paragraph 11, R. 170-171).
18.

Niederhauser

Builders and Development

Corp. did

not become aware of the problem in the total amount paid by the
Campbells on their home until approximately January 6, 1989 and
shortly thereafter informed the Campbells and First Security Bank
of the problem

(Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser,

paragraph 12, R. 171).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellantfs argument may be summarized as follows:
A.

The Court failed to consider the effect of the mutual

mistake upon the contract formed by the parties at the closing on
the defendant's home.
B.

The

Court

based

its

decision

to grant

defendants1

Motion for Summary Judgment upon a lien waiver signed by the
plaintiff.

The lien waiver was on the back of a check made as a

progress payment and should not have applied to the project as a
whole, and under any circumstances, the signing of a lien waiver
should not prohibit the plaintiff from pursuing causes of action
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for breach of contract, personal

liability under the bonding

statute, and quantum meruit.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EXECUTION OF A LIEN WAIVER DOES NOT ABROGATE A BUILDER'S
RIGHT TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED UPON
THE FAILURE OF THE OWNER TO PAY ALL OF THE SUMS DUE AND
OWING UNDER THE TERMS OF A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT.
The Court's memorandum

Motions",
Summary

R.

decision entitled

"Ruling on

154 - 155, in which the defendants' Motion for

Judgment

is granted

and the plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary Judgment is denied does not address the issues in the
case concerning the alleged breach of contract or the issue of
what effect of the mutual mistake at the time of closing had on
the contract.

The only basis cited for the Court's decision in

the Ruling on Motions is the fact that the plaintiff had signed a
lien waiver and then had filed a mechanic's lien.
The Order, Judgment and Decree, R. 195 - 197, and the
Amended Order, Judgment and Decree, R. 287 - 288, do not address
the issues of the alleged breach of contract or the issue of what
effect the mutual mistake at the time of closing had upon the
contract.
The plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and Development
Corp., filed an objection to the Order, Judgment and Decree, R.
186

- 187, in which

decision

recorded

the plaintiff

in the

Ruling

alleged

that the

on Motions

and

Court's

the Order,

Judgment and Decree did not address the issues of the breach of
contract, the effect of the mistake at the closing had upon the
-9-

contract, the plaintifffs claims for personal liability under the
bonding statute, or quantum meruit issues.
The Court's ruling on the Objection to Judgment, R. 208
- 209, simply
judgment

to

states

that

defendants

"the

was

Court's

intended

granting

to cover

all

of

summary

causes of

action, including breach of contract, quantum meruit, and failure
to comply with bonding law".

The Court gives no indication in

the Ruling on the Objections to the Judgment on what basis the
Court decides the issues concerning the breach of contract, the
effect of the mistake at the closing on the contract, on what
basis the defendants are not personally liable under the bonding
law, or on what basis the plaintiff's claims for quantum meruit
are denied.
Because of the vagueness and the total failure of the
Court, either in its own memorandum decision, or in its signed
orders, to address the issues of the breach of contract, the
effect of the mistake at closing upon the contract, the personal
liability
issues,

under

the

a request

to

bonding

statute, or

clarify

the quantum

the judgment

was made

meruit
by

the

plaintiff to the Court by a letter dated March 19, 1990, a copy
of the letter is attached to this Brief as Exhibit
Court

refused

to clarify

its judgment

(Ruling

"D" .

on Motion

The
to

Clarify, R. 258).
Since the only reason given in the Ruling on the Motion
for Summary Judgment for the summary judgment of the defendant
being granted was the fact that the plaintiff had signed a lien
-10-

waiver, it is reasonable to assume that the Court determined that
plaintiff's signing of a lien waiver, in addition to waiving the
plaintiff's liens rights, also waived the plaintiff's rights to
proceed forward on a breach of contract cause of action.

If such

is the ruling of the Court, it is clearly erroneous under Utah
law.
This

Court,

in

Harris-Dudley

Plumbing

Company

v.

Professional United World Travel Association, 592 P.2d 586 (Utah
1979), in explaining the purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes,
stated as follows:
"The purpose of the liens thus created by
statute is to assist in the collection of
laborer's and materialmen's claims and not to
diminish in any way the claimant's rights to
enforce the obligation of contracts or any
other remedy the claimant may have."
Id. at 588.
Since

mechanic's

liens

statutes

were

intended

to

augment and not replace the rights of laborers and materialmen
who have provided labor or materials in the improvement of real
property,

a lien waiver will not act to waive the rights of

laborers and materialmen to their contract causes of action or
their claims for personal liability under the bonding law.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska, in the case
of Gibson v. Koutsky-Brennan-Vana

Company, 9 N.W.2d

298 (Neb.

1943), was faced with the specific issue of whether a lien waiver
acted

to waive

the contract rights of a materialman who had

provided materials

in the improvement of real property.

-11-

The

Nebraska Supreme Court, in ruling that a lien waiver had no such
effect, stated as follows:
"No contention is or can be made that
defendant's waiver of a mechanic's lien
destroyed its right to recover by whatever
remedy available any balance due for material
furnished to the plaintiffs, either before or
after the execution and delivery of the
waiver." Id. at 301.
Similarly, this Court, in Pierce v. Pepper, 405 P.2d
345

(Utah 1965), held that a lien waiver did not destroy the

rights of a materialman to pursue a claim under Utah's bonding
statute, §14-2-1, et seq.
The

fact

that

plaintiff, Niederhauser

Builders

and

Development Corp., executed a lien waiver on the reverse side of
a check therefore cannot prevent the plaintiff from pursuing its
claims
bonding

for breach of contract, personal
statute, and quantum meruit

liability

under

the

against defendants, SCOTT

CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL.
Hi

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT
OF THE MUTUAL MISTAKE ON THE CONTRACT FORMED BY THE PARTIES
AT THE TIME OF CLOSING.
Again, what basis, if any, the Court had for ruling in

favor of the defendants on the Motion for Summary Judgment on the
contract issue is unclear, and the Court has refused to explain
or to clarify the basis of its judgment.
There was no dispute between the parties that a mistake
occurred at the closing on the Campbells' home.
of Bruce Niederhauser

The Affidavits

(R. 89 - 105, R. 167 - 180) and Bryan

Marston establishing that a mistake occurred at the closing were
-12-

unopposed.

Defendants did not deny that a mistake occurred, but

rather suggested that Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp.
should

pursue

(Memorandum

the

in

Judgment, R.

bank

Support

50 - 51).

rather
of

than pursuing

Defendants'

the

Motion

defendants

for

If, however, the Court

Summary

felt that a

contract was made at the time of closing where the price of the
home would be $125,214.00

(Ruling on Motions, R. 155, Exhibit

"C",

Niederhauser,

Affidavit

of

Bruce

R.

9 8 ) , then

such a

contract was based upon a mutual mistake of the parties.
The law in the State of Utah is that a mutual mistake
makes

a contract

recision.

voidable

and

is

the

basis

for

equitable

See Tanner v. District Court Judges, 649 P.2d 5, 6

(Utah 1982) and Tarrant v. Monson, 619 P.2d 1210, 1211 (Nevada
1980).
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Robert Langston Limited
v. McQuarrie, 741 P. 2d 554, 557 (Utah 1987), defined a mutual
mistake as follows:
"A mutual mistake occurs when both parties,
at the time of c o n t r a c t i n g , share a
misconception about a basic assumption or
vital fact upon which they base their
bargain."
In the
Niederhauser

case

at bar, at the time of

Builders and Development

closing,

both

Corp. and the Campbells

were laboring under a mistake as to the amount that was to be
paid

to Niederhauser

construction loan.

Builders and Development Corp. from the

Both plaintiff and defendants assumed that

the final draw on the construction loan would be paid in full.
-13-

It cannot be disputed

that the cost of the home is a basic

assumption or vital fact upon which the agreements reached at
closing were based.
In the most recent decision of this Court concerning
the doctrine of mistake, in the case of Guardian State Bank v.
Stangl, this Court ruled that even a unilateral mistake as to the
legal effect of a contract was sufficient to give a Court power
to reform the contract.

In the Guardian state case, this Court

stated as follows:
"In its most simple and most straight-forward
sense, the law really only enforces the
intent of the parties as to the fundamental
agreement between them; a mistake in the
recordation or the moralization of an
agreement or document may not be exploited by
one party to take advantage of the other.
Principals of common honesty are not foreign
to the law and equity."
In the case

at bar, the defendants, CAMPBELLS, are

attempting to take advantage of a mutual mistake made between the
parties.

The Campbells contracted for Niederhauser Builders and

Development Corp. to build a home for them on a specific lot.
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. built a home pursuant
to the terms of the contract, which had a value, once all of the
additions and overruns by the Campbells in their allowances were
calculated,
credits

made

$125,214.00,

of

$130,294.10.

by

The total

the

Campbells

at

leaving

a balance

due

the

of
time

the payments
of

and owing

closing

and
was

of $5,080.10.

(These figures do not include amounts paid by Campbells for their
own

long

term

financing.)

Although
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all

parties

to

the

transaction

have

recognized

that

a mistake

occurred,

the

Campbells have attempted to take advantage of the mistake which
was made to the detriment of the plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders
and Development Corp.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A LIEN WAIVER ON THE BACK OF
A CHECK MADE PAYABLE TO NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. WAS EFFECTIVE IN WAIVING NIEDERHAUSER
BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.!S RIGHT TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN
WHERE THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS THAT
PROGRESS PAYMENTS WERE ISSUED WITH A LIEN WAIVER ON THE BACK
OF EACH CHECK AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS THAT THE
LIEN RELEASE ONLY DISCHARGED THE LIEN RIGHTS AS TO THE
MATERIALS AND LABOR FOR WHICH PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THAT
PARTICULAR CHECK.
The

course

of

dealing

between

the parties

in this

construction contract was that progress payments were made and
each check contained a lien waiver which contained the following
language:
"Lien waiver:
In consideration of the
payment of this check, the payee, by
endorsing, causing to be endorsed, stamping
this check with a deposit stamp, or otherwise
negotiating the same, waives, releases and
relinquishes all right of lien or claims
payee has to date upon the premises described
on the reverse side hereof.
The payee
certifies that this check is payment for
labor and/or materials that were actually
performed upon and/or furnished to the
described premises.
Payee warrants and
guarantees under penalty of fraud that
payment in full has been made by the payee to
all of the laborers and suppliers of labor
and all materials to the said premises
incurred to date at the instance of payee.
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless
the owner and First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. and/or its assigns from any loss, claims
or expenses by reason or rising out of said
lien or claim."
(Affidavit of Scott
Campbell, R. 77; Lien Waiver, R. 56)
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A copy of three separate checks with the identical lien
waiver is found in the record at page 56.
Where

lien waivers

are signed on progress payments,

this Court has refused to treat the lien waiver as applying to
the entire construction project, but rather has treated the lien
waiver

as applying

only

to those specific

items of

labor or

materials paid for by the specific check.
In Brimwood

Homes

Inc. v. Knudsen

Builders

Supply

Company, the issue before this Court was the "import and effect
of the provision" in the

"receipt and lien release" that

"in

consideration thereof, the undersigned hereby waives, releases
and discharges any lien right to the lien the undersigned has or
may hereafter require against said real property".

As in the

case at bar, in the Brimwood Homes case, in order to receive
payment

on

an

ongoing

construction

contract,

laborers

and

materialmen were required to sign lien releases which contained
the language quoted above.
final

payment

When the owner failed to make the

for the construction

on the real property, he

contended that the laborers and materialmen could not file a lien
based upon the lien releases which had been signed throughout the
period of the ongoing construction.

This Court, however, ruled

as follows:
"Under the circumstances of this case, we do
not believe that the defendant, nor the
plaintiff, intended that the release and
waiver agreement would relate to any future
lien rights which the defendant might
acquire. The executed documents, designated
as a 'release and waiver1 related only to the
particular debt paid and receipted for in the
-16-

particular transaction
particular instrument."
Further,

in

the

encompassed by that
Id, at 984.

Brimwood

Homes

case,

this

Court

specifically found that:
"Defendant, in receiving payments from
Prudential, was being paid no more than what
it was legally entitled to at the time.
Thus, a promise by defendant to waive rights
of future liens or other debts would be
without consideration." Id. at 984.
The holding of this Court in Brimwood Homes, supra., is
consistent

with

the

trend

of

other

state

interpretation of mechanic's lien statutes.

courts

in

the

In Portland Electric

and Plumbing Company v. Simpson, 651 P.2d 172 (Ore. App. 1982),
the Court of Appeals for the State of Oregon, in deciding the
identical issue of whether a lien release on the back of a check
representing progress payments, released all of the rights of the
individual to lien the property, ruled as follows:
"Here, the language of the lien release is
broad and susceptible to an all encompassing
interpretation.
H o w e v e r , g i v e n the
circumstances of its execution, not as part
of a single document referring to the entire
construction contract, but as part of each
progress payment, the more reasonable
interpretation is that the discharge released
the plaintiff's lien rights only as to
materials for which payment was made by a
particular check." Id. at 174.
In Ragsdale Brothers Roofing Inc. v. United Bank of
Denver,

N.A.,

744 P.2d

750

(Colo. App. 1987),

the Court of

Appeals for the State of Colorado, in ruling that a partial lien
waiver did not waive a lien for all materials and labor provided
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on the subject property to the date of the check on which the
lien waiver was written, stated as follows:
"According to his unrebutted testimony, he
was required to sign a partial waiver each
time he received a partial payment from the
owner and the amount of the payment he
received was to reflect the dollar amount
waived.
We find the circumstances and
language made the waiver ambiguous as to
whether it was a waiver of lien rights to
date or merely a waiver for the amount paid.
If the terms of the contract and evidence of
the alleged waiver of mechanic's lien are
ambiguous, doubt must be resolved against the
waiver.
(Citations omitted.) In absence of
language clearly indicating an intention to
waive a lien, it will not be supposed that
the labor or materialmen intended to
relinquish absolutely his statutory right to
claim one beyond the amount of consideration
received." Id. at 754 - 755.
In

the

case

at

bar,

Niederhauser

Builders

and

Development Corp. performed no additional labor after January 6,
1989, the date on which it signed the lien waiver.

The check

amount correctly reflected the amount of funds left due and owing
to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for work done by
Niederhauser

Builders

However, Niederhauser

and Development
Builders

Corp. up to that time.

and Development

Corp. did not

receive checks which should have paid other of its subcontractors
on this project.

Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. had

no reason to believe that by signing this check they were signing
a

final

dealing

lien waiver
had

for the entire project

as the course of

always been that when the partial payments were

issued, the lien waivers on the back of the checks applied only
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to the specific work performed or materials provided and paid for
by that specific check.
IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFF, NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., ON
ITS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER THE
BONDING STATUTE AND QUANTUM MERUIT WHERE THOSE ISSUES WERE
NOT BRIEFED NOR ARGUED BEFORE THE COURT.
The universal rule is that a judgment must be based on

facts.

A judgment

speculation.
(Cal.

cannot be based

on guess, conjecture

or

Oldenburg v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 314 P.2d 33

App. 1957); In re:

HaydenTs Estate, 254 P.2d 813 (Kan.

1953); Sisler v. Whitten, 393 P.2d 497 (Ok. 1964).

A judgment

must be based on facts and a judgment founded on doubts cannot
stand.

Evans v. Evans, 314 P. 2d 291 (Colo. 1957).

should

not be allowed

alone.

to rest on speculation

and

Jephson v. Ambuel, 473 P.2d 932 (Id. 1970).

A judgment
conjecture
Where there

is no evidence to support a trial court's finding, other than
basing the finding on pure guess work, the judgment cannot be
sustained.

Campbell v.

(M.M. 1955).

Schwers-Campbell, Inc., 245 P.2d

497

Judgments cannot rest on speculation or conjecture

and there must be some substantial evidence for their support.
Crewse v. Munroe, 355 P.2d 637 (Or. 1960).
The record in this case may be searched in vain for any
argument
under

concerning

the

bonding

the personal
law

statute

liability

of the

or the plaintiff's

defendants
claims

to

quantum meruit if the building contract did not include all or
some

of

the

extras

provided

by

Development Corp. to the Campbells.
-19-

Niederhauser

Builders

and

There was nothing in the

briefs submitted by the plaintiffs or the defendants nor were the
issues concerning the bonding law and quantum meruit included in
the oral argument.

Since there was absolutely no information

provided to the Court on these causes of action, it is difficult
to understand on what basis the Court would determine that the
plaintiff had no cause of action on these two theories.
As already noted in this Brief, the only reason given
by this Court in its memorandum decision or in the two Orders
signed by the Court as to why the defendantsf Motion for Summary
Judgment

was granted

and the plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary

Judgment was denied was that the plaintiff had signed a lien
waiver.

As previously noted, this Court has already ruled that

the signing of a lien waiver does not prevent the claimant from
pursuing his rights under §14-2-1, et seq.

Utah's statute which

provides for personal liability if the owner fails to obtain a
payment bond.

Pierce v. Pepper, 405 P.2d 345 (Utah 1965).

The principals of justice

and fairness are violated

when a court, without any information before it, either in the
form of briefs, affidavits or oral arguments, makes decisions on
causes of action and then declines to inform parties on what
basis the court made such a determination.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the trial court's granting of
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment in that it failed to take
into consideration the mutual mistake upon the contract formed by
-20-

the

parties

property.
have

at

the

time

of

the

closing

on

the

Campbells'

The lien release signed by the plaintiff would not

the effect of waiving

the plaintiff's

rights to pursue

causes of action for breach of contract, personal liability under
the bonding statute, or for quantum meruit claims.

The Court

therefore also erred in granting summary judgment against the
plaintiff on those claims.
DATED this £/

day of November, 1990.
SMITH & HANNA

By
Charles W. Hanna
Attorney for Appellant
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)355-5656

brief.ni#
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

declare

that

I caused

to be

mailed,

postage

prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief

for Appellant,

in Case No, 900301, this (y\\

November, 1990, to:
W. Jerry Ungricht
NIEDER & WARD
7050 S. Union Park Ave., #420
Midvale, UT 84047
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EXHIBIT A

FILED IH CLERK'S OFFICE
DAVIS f r . - T Y . UTAH

JUL

16 2 03 PH 'SO

CLERK, 2::c :-vr. COURT

BY

W. JERRY UNGRICHT, #3305
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple
Suite 3030
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0441

DEPUTYCLEK;

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED ORDER,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.
Civil No. 45208
SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA
CAMPBELL,

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on plaintiff's
and defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, before the Honorable
Douglas Cornaby, District Court Judge on September 12, 1989, the
plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by Charles W.
Hanna, and the defendants appearing in person and being represented

by W. Jerry Ungricht.

The Court, having

heard

the

testimony and argument of counsel, and being fully advised, and
having entered its ruling on the motions, which is incorporated
by reference herein, therefore,
* * . * »

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

The defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Plain-

t i f f s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The plaintiff's lien filed on the following described

property belonging to the defendants located at 1349 East Skyline
Drive, Bountiful, Utah, and legally described as:
"All of Lot 44, Quailbrook Subdivision, Plat A,
according to the official plat thereof as recorded in
the Office of the Davis County Recorder."
which lien was filed

in the Davis County Recorder's Office on

March 7, 1989, as Entry No. 851370, in Book 1281, at page 346, of
the records of said county, is void and of no effect.
3.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendants, as and

for attorney's fees, the sum of $5,285.50.
4.

Plaintiff is ordered

to pay to the defendants, as and

for costs of court incurred herein, the sum of $60.00.
DATED this

/£

day of

,S^/s
BY THE COURT:

, 1990.

EXHIBIT B

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
DAVIS CCUJiTY. UTAH

OCT 21 !U2i ! 83
In the Second Judicial District Court
^
CLERK, 2MuD'ST. COURT
in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utaft

NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

A&

DEFUTf OLERX

)
)
)

RULING ON OBJECTIONS
TO JUDGMENT

)

SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA
CAMPBELL,

)

Civil No. 45208

)

Defendants.
On October 11, 1989, the plaintiff filed objections to the
defendant's proposed judgment. The defendant filed the proposed
judgment on October 6, 1989.
The court now rules on the
objections.
The plaintiff argues that defendants should only be awarded
partial summary judgment.
Such is not the case.
The court's
granting of * summary judgment to the defendants was intended to
cover all causes of action, including breach of contract, quantum
meruit, and failure to comply with bonding law.
In the September 14, 1989 ruling the court awarded the
defendants a reasonable attorney fee.
The plaintiff complains
that $6,230.50 is not reasonable. It may not be. The court will
set it for hearing.
The court believes the defendants are
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee to defend against the lien
foreclosure claim.
Of necessity this must include defending to
some degree the claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit and
failure to comply with the bonding law.
The counterclaim,

riLmn

however, is clearly not included in reasonable attorneys fees.
Counsel are urged prior to the hearing to settle this matter
without hearing. If the defendants win at the hearing, the court
will award another attorney fee.
The court is signing the judgment today, except as to
attorneys fees, which will be determined by stipulation or at a
hearing to be set by the court.
Dated October 26, 1989.
BY THEL COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to W. Jerry Ungricht, Suite
520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT
84111 and Charles W.
Hanna, City Centre I, Suite 401, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111 on October 27, 1989.

!c\/(x TjpAHb

Deputy Clerk
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In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

CLE"/., : . . : . ^C'.IT

County of Davis, State of Utah

BY

i_ J l

*A__
y

N1EDERHAUSER BUILDERS,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTIONS

vs.
SCOTT G. CAMPBELL, et al. ,

Civil No. 45208

Defendants,

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the
defendants1 motion for summary
judgment came before the court
for hearing on September 12, 1989 with Charles W. Hanna appearing
as counsel for the plaintiff and W. Jerry Ungricht appearxng as
counsel for the defendants. After oral argument, the court took
the motions under advisement.
The court now rules on the
motions.
The parties entered into a basic contract on July 12, 1988.
The amount of the contract was for $87,700.
The contract
provided that the buyers would pay an increased cost because of
an addition to the size of the home and also would pay
construction loan costs.
The contract also provided that any
authorized change orders will be used for all work not included
in the contract.
On the date of December 30, 1988, a document entitled
addendum was signed by both parties.
This addendum was a
settlement of righta under the contract and provided that the
initial bid price -of the house had been $87,700, that the lot
price was $25,000, and that the agreed new price would be
$125,214. This means that the buyers were required to pay to the

FJLAJED

plaintiff an additional $12,514 in addition to the original
contract price.
There is a document in the file entitled settlement
statement.
This statement was executed .and signed on December
30, 1988. It shows the contract price was $125,214. After each
party was given credits for their various entitlements, the
plaintiff was to be paid a check of $10,204.24.
There is a check in the file issued by Associated Title
Company of Davis County payable to the plaintiff in the amount of
$10,204.24.
This check was dated January 4, 1989.
It was
apparently paid through the bank on January 9, 1989 and in the
endorsement it bears the signature of the plaintiff.
The amount
of the check was the same amount shown on the settlement
statement.
One of the documents in the file is the back of a check
endorsed by the plaintiff on January 6, 1989.
It bears the
following statement, "Signature required on both lien waiver and
endorsement." Number one is listed as a lien waiver, and bears
the signature of the plaintiff.
Number two calls for an
endorsement of the check and is endorsed by the plaintiff. The
lien waiver portion states that endorsement of the check was "a
release and relinquishment of all right of lien or claims payee
now has to date upon the premises described on the reverse side
hereof."
On March 7, 1989, the plaintiff caused a lien in the amount
of $5,319.62 to be filed against the property.
Thereafter, on
April 3, 1989, the plaintiff commenced this action claiming the
amount of $5,319.62 to be owed by the defendants to the plaintiff
and arising out of the contract. The plaintiff was asking for a
foreclosure of the lien and the sale of the property in order to
pay the amount requested.
Under the
documents that

set of facts recited
are part of the file

herein, based on
it is clear that

the
the

defendant
is entitled to its motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. The plaintiff
filed a lien after agreeing not to file any liens against the
property.
When the plaintiff filed the notice of lien in this
case, it violated its agreement not to do so.
The defendants
have been the prevailing parties in this case and are therefore
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for defending it. The
counsel for the defendant is directed to submit an affidavit of
reasonable attorney fees to the court and to opposing counsel.
If opposing counsel does not agree as to the reasonableness of
the attorney fee requested, the court will set the matter for a
hearing.
The defendant is ordered to draw an order consistent with
this ruling.
Dated September 14, 1989.
B^THE COURT:

JUBGE^

A

/

Certificate of Mailing:
/
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Charles W. Hanna, City
Centre I, Suite 401, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and W. Jerry Ungricht, Suite 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on September £4, 1989.
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March 19, 1390

HAND DELIVERED
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, UT 84025
Re:

Robert W. Speirs Plumbing v. Scott G. Campbell
Civil No. S90746720CV

Dear Judge Cornaby:
On October 26, 1989, you signed a Summary Judgment in
the case of Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Scott
G. Campbell and Claudia Campbell. Subsequently, on or about
December 12, 1989, I filed a Complaint on behalf of two
subcontractors of Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for
the labor and materials which they provided on the Campbell home.
On the 21st of February, 1990, Jerry Ungricht, the attorney for
the Campbells, filed a Third Party Complaint against Niederhauser
Builders and Development Corp. alleging that they had paid
Niederhauser in full for all work performed under the contract
for building the Campbells' home.
The purpose of this letter is to request that Mr.
Ungricht and I might meet with you for a few moments to discuss
the basis of your judgment in Niederhauser Builders v. Scott and
Claudia Campbell. Specifically, I would like to understand
whether you found that the Campbells had completely complied with
the terms of their contract or whether you found that the
Campbells had not breached their contract because of a waiver by
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. The Niederhauser
Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell case is currently en
appeal and 1 have the court's file in order to draft my brief. I
am therefore enclosing a copy of your memorandum decision in
order to refresh your memory on this matter.
If it would be possible for Mr. Ungricht and I to meet
with you for just a few moments on Wednesday, March 21, 1990, it
would be greatly appreciated.

\ L S O A D M I T T E D T O P R A C T I C E IN C O L O R A D O
<VLSO A D M I T T E D T O P R A C T I C E IN O K L A H O M A

The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaoy
Marcn 19, 1990
Page 2

Thank you for your help and cooperation in this matter
Very truly yours,
BROWN, SMIT;# & HANNA

Charles W. Kanna
CWH/klh
Enclosures

